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1 Introduction
The growing environmental concerns motivate the developed countries to
adapt their tax structure by introducing new taxes on pollutants. France,
following the Scandinavian countries, has planned to adopt a carbon tax in
the next few years. The French Environmental Protection Agency (ADEME)
is entirely nanced by revenues of taxes on pollutants, called General Tax on
Polluting Activities. One of the advantages of the environmental tax is that
it provides a public revenue which can be recycled. This is the reason why it
is often preferred to subsidies or emission quotas. Several authors like Parry
(1995) or Poterba (1993) argued that this revenue recycling could reduce or
even annihilate the gross cost of the implementation of an environmental
tax. The revenues of these taxes are used to limit the economic distortions
of the reform by reducing other taxes, or alternatively, these revenues are
allocated to pollution abatement programs. However, whatever the govern-
ments decision about the use of the tax revenues, public engagements in
the environmental protection are often constrained by scal objectives which
impose to control public decits and public debt. Therefore, a pre-existing
high level of public debt can be an obstacle for the launching of new envi-
ronmental protection programs. This is basically the case in Europe during
the global debt crisis of 2007-2010.
Accordingly, we study the impacts of environmental policies under a debt
stabilization constraint, when public actions to protect the environment are
at least partially nanced by public funds. Can public debt be an obstacle for
the nancing of environmental policies? Reversely, could the environmental
tax reduce e¢ ciently the public debt burden, and protect the environment
simultaneously?
To analyze the interactions between environmental policies and public
debt, this article considers an overlapping generations model à la Diamond
(1965) with an environmental intergenerational externality. Pollution emis-
sion occurs through production processes which deteriorate the environmen-
tal quality, harming the welfare of future generations. Public expenditure for
pollution abatement are nanced by taxation and debt. Moreover, a debt
stabilizing constraint imposes a constant level of debt per output.
We take into account both the e¢ ciency and the intergenerational distri-
butional aspects of environmental taxes: like Bovenberg and Heijdra (1998),
we examine whether a revenue-neutral increase in the pollution tax compen-
sated by a change of the labor tax can yield a double dividend and whether
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a higher pollution tax can be Pareto welfare improving by beneting all gen-
erations.
We show that the steady-state levels of the capital stock and of the public
pollution abatement are the key factors that explain the consequences of the
tax reform. Namely, if the capital stock is low and the public pollution abate-
ment is large enough, an increase of the environmental tax, compensated by
a decrease of the income tax, will increase both the environmental quality
and the aggregate householdsconsumption. During the convergence to the
steady-state, these benets are no longer available for the rst generation
that has to implement the policy, but the policy may be welfare improving
in the long run. Finally, an increase of the environmental taxation budget-
balanced by a variation of the debt-output ratio may also increase the envi-
ronmental quality and the aggregate consumption. Hence, the scal policy
may improve the aggregate consumption and the environmental quality while
reducing the debt-output ratio. Our ndings conrm the empirical results
of Raush (2013). Using an OLG dynamic general-equilibrium model of the
U.S. economy, Raush (2013) shows that when a carbon tax is employed to
consolidate public debt, the environmental policies allow the possibility of
sustained welfare gains for future generations.
Whether an environmental tax reform can be designed without negatively
a¤ecting the economic welfare has given rise to a huge literature on the double
dividend issue. Terkla (1984), Parry (1995), or Poterba (1993) rst had the
intuition that the recycling of the revenue of an environmental tax could re-
duce or even eliminate the gross cost of its implementation. As governments
use the revenues from pollution taxes to decrease other distortionary taxes,
environmental taxes may lead to a double dividend, according to Goulders
denition, by improving the environmental quality and achieving a less dis-
tortionary tax system (Goulder (1995)). Baumol and Oates (1988), Pearce
(1991) and Oates (1991) suggested that these e¢ ciency gains could be a
powerful argument in favor of environmental taxation.
Beside these potential e¢ ciency properties, environmental decisions have
an impact on the welfare of both current and future generations, since envi-
ronmental quality is a public good shared by di¤erent generations. These in-
tergenerational issues on environmental externalities and taxation have been
widely studied. John and Pecchenino (1994) and John et alii (1995) examine
the e¤ect of an environmental tax which revenues nance a public pollution
abatement sector. Bovenberg and Heijdra (1998) examine the e¤ects of a
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green tax on polluting capital when the tax revenue is redistributed by lump-
sum intergenerational transfers. More generally, this literature concludes
that a double dividend can be obtained at the expense of equity (Proost and
van Regemorter (1995), Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1996), Bosello et alii
(2001), Chiroleu-Assouline and Fodha (2005), (2006) and (2014)).
Nevertheless, in these previous studies, government cannot fund pollu-
tion abatement programs by issuing public debt. In consequence, they only
consider tax nancing schemes. Debt nancing has been introduced in dy-
namic models with environmental concerns (Bovenberg and Heijdra (1998);
Heijdra et alii (2006), Fernandez et alii (2010)), but these contributions fo-
cus on a di¤erent issue than ours. Instead of using debt to nance a share
of pollution abatement, debt policy makes possible to redistribute welfare
gains from future to existing generations. In our model, the role of the pub-
lic debt is twofold: as usual, it redistributes welfare among young and old
generations, but rst of all, it nances the public pollution abatement sector.
Hence, the redistribution properties of the public debt are limited by the
environmental actions of the government. Fodha and Seegmuller (2012) and
(2014) analyze the consequences of some environmental tax reforms under
a public debt stabilization constraint. In Fodha and Seegmuller (2012), the
households can invest in private pollution abatement activities, in addition
to public abatement. Fodha and Seegmuller (2014) consider the impacts of
pollution on life expectancy. These articles point out the crucial role of the
public debt on the dynamics of capital stock and environmental quality, and
to reach the optimal allocation. In this paper, we rather analyze the impacts
of the tax reforms on the capital stock and the environmental quality, while
maintaining the debt to output ratio constant.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an OLG
model in which environmental externalities are provided as a by-product of
production, and the government issues debts and imposes taxes on personal
income and production for nancing public emission abatement. Section
3 denes the intertemporal equilibrium and examines the multiplicity and
the stability of steady states. Section 4 studies a possibility of the double
dividend when the increase of the environmental tax is balanced through a
decrease of the income tax. Section 5 considers the intergenerational dis-
tributive issues. Section 6 presents the consequences of an environmental
tax reform balanced by the debt-output ratio. The nal section provides the
conclusions.
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2 The model
We consider an overlapping generation model with discrete time (t = 0; 1; :::;
+1), capital accumulation, and environmental quality which degrades with
production, but may be improved by public abatements. These government
expenditures are nanced by environmental taxation on production, labor
income taxes, or public debt.
2.1 Household
At each period, a new generation is born. There is no population growth
and population size of a generation is normalized to N > 0. Individuals live
for two periods. They have preferences over their consumption bundle when
young (ct) and old (dt+1), and environmental quality when young (Et) and
old (Et+1). Et is an externality for the household. The life-cycle utility is
given by:
ln ct + v (Et) +  (ln dt+1 + v (Et+1))
where  2 (0; 1) is the discount factor,  > 0 the relative weight of the
environmental quality and v (:) measures the welfare gains from the environ-
mental quality. The young born in period t inelastically supplies one unit of
labor and receives real wage (wt). A personal income tax (wt ) is imposed
on the real wage and the after-tax income is shared between present con-
sumption and savings (st). When old, the household is retired and entirely
consumes the remunerated savings (rt+1st) where rt+1 is the real interest
rate.1 Budget constraints of an individual born in period t are given by:
ct + st = (1  wt )wt; dt+1 = rt+1st
Then, the savings function is derived as:
st =

1 + 
(1  wt )wt
Because labor is inelastically supplied, the income tax does not distort
labor market.
1We assume complete depreciation of capital. Since the period length is quite long in
overlapping generations model with two-period lived households, this assumption is not
restrictive.
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2.2 Firms
A representative rm produces the unique nal good using a Cobb-Douglas
technology:
Yt = K

t L
1 
t ;
where Yt, Lt, and Kt are output, labor, and capital stock, respectively. The
intensive production function is given by yt = kt , where kt and yt are per
worker capital stock and output. Production process emits pollutions as by-
products and, therefore, the government imposes an environmental tax ( e)
on its product sales. Prots write (1   e)Yt   wtLt   rtKt. The rst order
conditions for prot maximization are:
wt = (1   e)(1  )kt ;
rt = (1   e)k 1t :
2.3 Government
The government imposes taxes on income and sales. Moreover, debt (Bt)
is issued in order to nance a share of government spending for emission
abatement (Gt). The government budget constraint is:
Bt = rtBt 1   (wt wtN +  eYt) +Gt:
with B 1 > 0 given.
To avoid explosive debt path, we assume that the government spending-
output Gt=Yt and debt-output Bt=Yt ratios are constant over time, i.e. equal
to g  0 and   0, respectively (see also de la Croix and Michel (2002)).
Therefore, the government budget constraint is:
Yt = rtYt 1   (wt wtN +  eYt) + gYt:
2.4 Environmental quality
Pollution emission occurs through polluting production processes while the
government spends on public emission abatement. Because environmental
quality evolves in opposite direction than pollution, its law of motion is given
as:
Et+1 = (1  )Et + Gt   Yt, with E0 given,
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where  > 0,  > 0, and  2 (0; 1) are e¢ ciency parameters measuring the
pollution emission from production, the public emission abatement, and the
capacity to converge to the natural environmental quality in the absence of
any pollution ow.
3 Equilibrium, steady states and dynamics
The labor market equilibrium is given as N = Lt, for all t. Therefore,
environmental quality per young household et satises:
et+1 = (1  )et + (g   )kt
and the government budget constraint rewrites:
yt = rtyt 1   (wt wt +  eyt) + gyt:
Since g,  and  e are kept constant over time, the government must adjust
the income tax rate to balance the government budget:
wt wt = rtyt 1   ( e +    g)yt: (1)
The market-clearing condition for capital market is described as:
kt+1 = st   yt (2)
Dening zt+1 = kt+1=kt as an investment factor, equation (2) can be
rewritten as:
zt+1 = (zt) =
(+  e)  
1 + 
  
1 + 
1   e
zt
(3)
where   1    g. By direct inspection of this equation, we immediately
see that the following assumption is required to have positive values of zt:
Assumption 1 (i)  > 0 and (ii) (+  e) > :
We are now able to dene an intertemporal equilibrium:
Denition 1 Under Assumption 1, an intertemporal equilibrium is char-
acterized as a sequence of investment factors (zt)1t=1, such that (3) is
satised, given z0 > 0.
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Dynamics are driven by a one-dimensional dynamic system, where zt is a
predetermined variable. Note that z0 given implies two initial conditions k0
and k 1. In fact, the second initial condition comes from the initial condition
on debt B 1 > 0 and the constant debt-output ratio Bt = Yt. Given the
sequence (zt), we are able to determine (kt) dened by kt+1 = zt+1kt . Finally,
given (kt), one deduces the dynamics of et.
The steady-state investment factors are solutions to:
P (z) = z2   (+ 
e)  
1 + 
z +
(1   e)
1 + 
= 0 (4)
Note that the corresponding stationary level of capital (k) and environ-
mental quality (e) per capita are given by:
k = z
1
1  (5)
e =
g   

z

1  (6)
Steady states and dynamics are determined as follows:
Proposition 1 Let Assumption 1 be satised and  such that (+  e) =
 + 2
p
(1 + )(1   e). When  2 [0; ), there are two steady states, an
unstable one z and a stable one z, given as:
z =
(+  e)    pf(+  e)  g2   4(1 + )(1   e)
2(1 + )
(7)
z =
(+  e)   +pf(+  e)  g2   4(1 + )(1   e)
2(1 + )
 ( e; g; ) (8)
When  = , a saddle-node bifurcation occurs and no steady state exists when
 > .
Proof. The existence of two steady states requires that the discriminant of
P (z) must be positive, that is, f( +  e)   g2 > 4(1 + )(1    e).
Under Assumption 1, this condition can be reduced to f( +  e)   g >
2
p
(1 + )(1   e). This denes an upper bound  lower than (+ e)
(Assumption 1). When  <  there exist two steady states, given by (7) and
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Figure 1: Dynamics with two steady states.
(8). When  = , the two steady states merge, and disappear for  > .
We deduce the stability properties from the features of (3). Since
lim
zt!0
(zt) =  1; lim
zt!+1
(zt) =
(+  e)  
1 + 
> 0; (zt)
0 > 0; (zt)00 < 0
the lower steady state is unstable, whereas the larger one is stable (see Figure
1).
The conguration where there are two steady states ( < ) is represented
in Figure 1.2 The lower steady state z is unstable, while the higher one z is
stable. Therefore, for zt lower than z, the economy is relegated to a poverty
trap, where zt decreases to 0. Otherwise, the economy converges to the steady
state z. Note that since kt+1 = zt+1kt , the convergence of the investment
factor to a stationary value corresponds to the convergence of the capital
stock kt to its steady state level.
By direct inspection of (4), we see that without debt ( = 0), the trap
disappears. The dynamics become zt+1 =
(+e)
1+
and may be explicitly
2Recall that, as it is clear from the proof of the proposition,  lower than  satises
Assumption 1.
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given by a sequence of per capita capital (kt) satisfying kt+1 =
(+e)
1+
kt .
Therefore, the higher steady state k =

(+e)
1+
1=(1 )
is globally stable,
whereas the lower steady state k = 0 is unstable. There is no more any
poverty trap. Indeed, the trap comes from a crowding-out e¤ect due to the
existence of public debt.
Using (3), we also deduce that a larger public spending-output ratio rein-
forces the level of the trap. Indeed, we can show that @z=@g < 0, @z=@g > 0
and @(zt)=@g < 0 for all zt > 0. A larger income taxation is needed to
balance the budget, implying a lower saving. For g > =, the associated
level of environmental quality always raises at the low steady state, whereas
it raises at the high steady state if the e¢ ciency of public spending  is large
enough.
In the next sections, we will focus on the e¤ect of scal policy on a steady
state. Because zt is a predetermined variable, we focus on the stable steady
state z.3
4 Environmental tax reform balanced by la-
bor income taxation
We are interested in the e¤ect of an increase of environmental taxation, given
that public spending-output and debt-output ratios are constant. Therefore,
income taxation will vary to balance the budget, modifying the level of the
investment factor. We will focus on a possible improvement of both envi-
ronmental quality and macroeconomic variables, i.e. capital accumulation,
aggregate consumption.
As a preliminary step, we examine the e¤ects of such an increase of envi-
ronmental taxation on the investment factor and the labor income tax rate.
Proposition 2 Let Assumption 1 be satised and assume  2 [0; ). Follow-
ing a raise of the environmental tax rate  e, the investment factor z increases,
while the labor income tax rate w evaluated at this steady state decreases.
Proof. The e¤ect on the steady state investment factor is derived by di¤er-
3To clarify notations, x will denote in the following the value of the variable xt evaluated
at the steady state z.
10
entiating (8):
dz
d e

d=dg=0
=
@()
@ e
=
(z + )pf(+  e)  g2   4(1   e)(1 + ) > 0
(9)
The steady state income tax rate is derived as a function of other policy
instruments from the government budget constraint (1):
w =

1  

z
+
g    e   
(1   e)(1  ) (10)
Using z = ( e; g; ), it can be dened as w  ( e; g; ). By di¤erentiating
(10) with respect to  e, we obtain:
dw
d e

dg=d=0
=   1
(1  )(1   e)

1  g + 
1   e +
(1   e)
z2
@()
@ e

< 0 (11)
The environmental tax, in principle, imposes additional costs on pollut-
ing behavior, which reduces the steady state investment factor. However,
recycling revenues provided from the increase of the environmental tax rate
leads to lower income tax rates. Because the latter e¤ect is greater than the
former, this environmental tax reform will increase the steady state invest-
ment factor. Alternatively, income taxation is more harmful to investment
or capital accumulation than environmental taxation. Considering the gov-
ernment budget, note that the decrease of w comes from two direct e¤ects
and a general equilibrium e¤ect. The rst one is explained by the increase of
government revenue coming from a larger environmental tax rate. The sec-
ond direct e¤ect goes through the fact that a higher environmental tax rate
directly decreases the interest rate. Finally, the general equilibrium e¤ect
goes in the same direction: a higher level of capital induces a decrease in the
interest rate. This leads to a smaller amount of debt reimbursement in the
future and, thereby, lowering the income tax rate.
We focus now more specically on the possible improvement of both en-
vironmental quality and macroeconomic variables of the model. Beside an
increase in the amount of environmental quality per capita (i.e. de=d e > 0),
we are interested in an increase in total amount of consumption per capita
C  c + d (i.e. dC=d e > 0), called in the macroeconomic e¤ect. Using
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the resource constraint y = c+ d+ k + gy, C is given by:
C = (1  g)k   k (12)
Given the government policy, k = kg maximizes C, where:
kg = [(1  g)] 11  (13)
From (5), the stationary investment factor corresponding to kg is zg = (1 
g). This allows us to show:
Proposition 3 Let Assumption 1 be satised and assume  2 [0; ). The en-
vironmental tax reform produces positive environmental and macroeconomic
e¤ects if and only if (i) the public emission abatement is large enough (g >
=), and (ii) there exists under-accumulation at the stable steady state (k <
kg).
Proof. Di¤erentiating (6) with d = dg = 0, we get:
de
d e

d=dg=0
=
(g   )
z
dk
d e

d=dg=0
From (5) and (9), the positive environmental e¤ect is obtained if and only if
the public emission abatement is large enough, that is, g > =.
Di¤erentiating now (12) with d = dg = 0, and using (5) and (13), one
obtains:
dC
d e

d=dg=0
=
(z)

1 
1  

zg
z
  1

dz
d e

d=dg=0
From (9), the macroeconomic e¤ect is obtained if and only if z < zg.
The environmental tax reform cuts the personal income tax, allowing a
larger level of capital per capita. This raises aggregate consumption when
there is under-accumulation, explaining the macroeconomic e¤ect. Note that
the requirement of under-accumulation of capital seems to be quite realistic,
since this is equivalently ensured by a not too low real interest rate, which
is experienced by most developed countries in the last decades. Recall that
under-accumulation also means dynamic e¢ ciency, which is a feature sup-
ported by the ndings of Abel et alii (1989). Public emission abatements
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play an important role for the environmental e¤ect. The public spending-
output ratio g or e¢ ciency of public emission abatements  has to be large
enough to ensure negative pollution ows. In this case, environmental quality
is positive at the steady state and positively varies with the level of capital.
At this stage, public debt has no yet an explicit role on our results.
However, since the macroeconomic e¤ect occurs if and only if there is under-
accumulation of capital, we now discuss its implication on the level of debt-
ouput ratio .
Because @( e; g; )=@ < 0 for all  < , there exists at most a unique
debt-output ratio  = g that corresponds to the maximized level of total
consumption per capita:
( e; g; g) = zg = (1  g): (14)
We deduce that there is under-accumulation if and only if  > g. Then,
considering the three cases, (i) g  0, (ii) g  , and (iii) g 2 (0; ), we
clarify in which conguration both positive macroeconomic and environmen-
tal e¤ects are fullled:
Proposition 4 Let Assumption 1 be satised and assume  2 [0; ). There
is under-accumulation, and both positive macroeconomic and environmental
e¤ects may apply, if one of the following conditions is satised:
(i)  e 6 1  1 g

[   (1 + )]  ^ e;
(ii) 
1+
< 4(1  ) and  2 (g; ).
Proof. When g  0, there is under-accumulation for all  2 [0; ). However,
because @( e; g; )=@ < 0, g  0 is equivalent to ( e; g; g) > ( e; g; 0).
Using (8) and (14), we deduce case (i) of the proposition.
To prove case (ii), we begin by determining . From Proposition 1, we recall
that  is the lowest root of:
[(+  e)  ]2   4(1 + )(1   e) = 0
, 2   2[+  e + 2(1 + )(1   e)] + [(+  e)]2 = 0
We deduce that:
 = [+  e + 2(1 + )(1   e)]
 2
p
(1 + )(1   e)[+  e + (1 + )(1   e)] (15)
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Note that g <  is equivalent to ( e; g; g) > ( e; g; ). Using (8) and (14),
this inequality rewrites  > (+ e) 2(1+)(1 g). Substituting (15),
one obtains P (1   e) > 0, with:
P (1   e)  2(1   e)2 + (1  g)[2(1 + )  ](1   e)
+(1 + )(1  g)2
The discriminant of this polynomial of degree 2 is given by 3(1   g)2[  
4(1  )(1 + )]. When 
1+
< 4(1  ), it is negative, which shows that
P (1   e) > 0 for all  e. This ensures that g < . Therefore, for  2 (g; ),
the steady state is characterized by under-accumulation.
Finally, note that of course, the conguration where g   is not relevant
to get under-accumulation.
In conguration (i) of Proposition 4, under-accumulation requires a suf-
ciently low environmental tax rate, i.e.  e 6 ^ e. Following Proposition 2,
this implies a su¢ ciently large labor income tax rate. As we have seen, this
last one has a dominant e¤ect on savings, and therefore capital accumulation.
This explains that a low  e may ensure under-accumulation.
The second conguration of Proposition 4 is also of special interest. Our
result requires a su¢ ciently large level of debt-output ratio. Therefore, debt
plays a role. It is useful to notice that the saving rate =(1+) is smaller than
1=2, while under a standard parametrization, the capital share in income 
belongs to (1=4; 1=2). In this case, the inequality 
1+
< 4(1 ) is fullled
and conguration (ii) of Proposition 4 may apply. Note that if  e > ^ e and
su¢ ciently close to ^ e, the debt-output ratio does not need to be so large
since g tends to zero.
Because the environmental tax reform positively a¤ects the steady-state
investment factor z, the conditions for the double dividend di¤er from those
in the literature. Ono (2005) considers an environmental tax reform that
cuts the social security tax in the absence of public emission abatement.
Therefore, the environmental dividend is produced only when the capital
per capita decreases. Moreover, the non-environmental dividend is obtained
because there is over-accumulation at the steady state and capital per worker
decreases.
14
5 Distributive issues
We now focus on the distributive issues of the tax reform balanced by labor
income taxation. We investigate both the intergenerational (i.e. between
generations) and the intragenerational (i.e. between life-cycle consumptions)
impacts of the policies. First, we analyze if following the implementation of
the scal reform at a given period, the total amount of consumption increases
during all the dynamic path converging to the stable steady state. Second,
we study if the tax reform implies an increase of consumption of both young
and old at the steady state.
We start by extending our analysis considering an intertemporal equilib-
rium which is no more stationary, but converges to the stable steady state.
The question we address is the following. Assuming that the steady state z
satises the positive e¤ects of the scal reform and we apply the scal reform
at some given date, should the scal reform be detrimental for some gener-
ations and for the consumption at some periods? Can we determine which
generations will benet from the scal reform? These issues are solved in the
following proposition:
Proposition 5 Let Assumption 1 be satised and assume that  2 [0; ).
Furthermore, consider that Propositions 3 and 4 are satised, and z0 > z.
Following an increase of  e at date t0, the positive e¤ects of the scal reform
fails at t = t0, but there exists t1 > t0 such that for all t > t1, they occur.
Proof. Assume that  0 increases permanently at t = t0. By direct inspection
of equation (3) and Figure 1, we deduce that zt raises for all t > t0+1. Since
kt+1 = zt+1k

t , the same happens for kt for all t > t0 + 1.
At t = t0, we have ct + dt = (1  g)kt   kt+1 = kt (1  g   zt+1). Since kt is
predetermined and zt+1 increases, aggregate consumption falls, which means
that the positive e¤ects of the scal reform fail.
Considering now that t > t0 + 1, d(ct + dt) = (1   g)k 1t dkt   dkt+1.
For t su¢ ciently large, namely t > et, the capital stock is characterized by
under-accumulation,4 i.e. we have (1   g)k 1t > 1, which implies that
d(ct+ dt) > dkt(1  dkt+1dkt ). Since at a stable equilibrium with zt = z we have
kt+1 = zk

t , there exists t > bt such that dkt+1=dkt < 1.
Therefore, when t > t1 = maxfet;btg, d(ct + dt) > 0 because dkt > 0 for all
4This is always the case if the sequence of (kt) is increasing though time.
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t > t0+1. Since et+1 = (1  )et+ (g  )kt also raises, the positive e¤ects
of the scal reform apply for all t > t1.
One may note that aggregate consumption decreases at some periods,
because consumption when old does. In fact, at t = t0, consumption when
young raises because, given the level of capital, the increase of the envi-
ronmental tax rate reduces the labor income tax rate, which enhances the
after-tax income to consume. In contrast, consumption when old goes down,
because a higher environmental tax rate reduces the interest rate, i.e. the
remunerated saving. At the following periods, the increase of ct is reinforced
by the raise of capital, which pushes up the wage and pushes down labor
income taxation. The interest rate becomes even lower because of the larger
capital accumulation. After some periods, this mechanism allows to get a
positive e¤ect on aggregate consumption.
This intergenerational issue on environmental externalities and taxation
has already been widely studied (John and Pecchenino (1994), John et alii
(1995), Howarth (1996), Fisher and van Marrewijk (1998)). The main result
of all these studies is that environmental taxation implies such a welfare loss
for the older generations experiencing the scal reform that its implementa-
tion can not be wished because the generation which would decide it would
also bear the heaviest burden. This result of the literature originates in the
fact that balanced environmental scal reforms have generally not been con-
sidered. We show here that this negative result for the political feasibility
can be generalized to the balanced-budget reform case.
We now focus on the distributive e¤ect of the policy between consump-
tions when young and old at the stable steady state. Should the scal reform
not only improve aggregate consumption but also both c and d? This is an
important issue because if this occurs, utility for consumption of young and
old consumers increase. Moreover, since under Proposition 4, the environ-
mental tax reform increases utility for environmental quality, this leads to a
double dividend.
Proposition 6 Let Assumption 1 be satised and assume that  2 [0; ).
Furthermore, consider that Propositions 3 and 4 are satised. Following an
increase of  e, the consumption of young c is increasing at the stable steady
state. For  < 
2
1  and 
e <    1 

, there exists e > 0, such that for all
 < e, the consumption of old d is increasing in  e too.
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Proof. At the stable steady state, consumption when young c is given by:
c =
1
1 + 
k


+  e +    (1  
e)
z

Because @z=@ e > 0 (see Proposition 2) and k = z1=(1 ), we deduce that
@c=@ e > 0.
Using the fact that saving is equal to k+y, consumption when old d is equal
to:
d = (1   e)

z

1  + z
2 1
1 

For  = 0, we have @z=@ e = z=(+  e). We deduce that:
@d
@ e
=
z

1 
(1  )(+  e)

2   (1  )   e
Therefore, for  = 0, @d=@ e > 0 if and only if  < 
2
1  , or equivalently
1   > g > 1    2
1  , and 
e <   1 

.
In this case, by continuity, there exists e > 0, such that for all  < e,5 we
have @d=@ e > 0.
If this proposition applies, welfare is increasing. Indeed, following an
increase of the environmental tax rate, environmental quality, consumptions
when young and old become larger. We obtain a double-dividend. Note that
this requires a su¢ ciently low debt-output ratio. Otherwise, the increase of
the environmental tax rate that decreases the return of assets, directly and
through the raise of capital, implies a too large decrease of the remunerated
debt. In this case, remunerated saving, i.e. consumption when old, decreases.
6 Environmental tax reform balanced by debt-
output ratio
In our model, the government issue debt to nance current decits. Instead
of assuming that a larger environmental tax rate may be used to reduce
5Note that this condition is compatible with case (i) of Proposition 4 and case (ii) for
e su¢ ciently close to ^e:
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income taxation, the environmental policy can also be used to modify the
debt-output ratio. We will address this issue now and investigate if such
a policy may induce both the positive environmental and macroeconomic
e¤ects at the stable steady state.
To be more specic, we consider that following an increase of  e, the gov-
ernment budget is balanced by a modication of , taking the labor income
tax rate as constant. Di¤erentiating (10) with dw = dg = 0, the policy
change is described as:
d
d e

dw=dg=0
=  @()=@
e
@()=@ (16)
Using (6) and (12), we note that debt-output ratio a¤ects aggregate con-
sumption and environmental quality only through the investment rate z.
Therefore, using Proposition 3, the positive environmental and macroeco-
nomic e¤ects of the scal reform may be obtained if z is increasing following
the new policy.
Proposition 7 Let Assumption 1 be satised and assume  2 [0; ). Con-
sider an increase of environmental taxation budget-balanced by a variation of
the debt-output ratio. If  e > 1  (1  g)=, there is b 2 (0; ), such that z
is increasing in  e if  < b. This goes through a decrease of . In this case,
the environmental tax reform produces positive environmental and macroeco-
nomic e¤ects if and only if (i) the public emission abatement is large enough
(g > =), and (ii) there exists under-accumulation at the stable steady state
(k < kg).
Proof. To investigate the e¤ect of the increase of  e on z, we rst note that:
dz
d e

dw=dg=0
=
@()
@ e
+
@()
@
d
d e

dw=dg=0
where @()=@ e > 0 is given by (9) and
@()
@
=   z + (1  
e)pf(+  e)  g2   4(1   e)(1 + ) < 0 (17)
Therefore, a su¢ cient condition to have dz=d e > 0 is d=d e < 0. Using
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(11) and (16), we deduce that d=d e and @()=@ have the same sign. To
nd it, a derivative of (10) with respect to the debt-output ratio gives:
@()
@
=

1  
1
z

1  
z
@()
@

  1
(1   e)(1  ) (18)
Using (17) and (18), @()=@ < 0 is equivalent to  () < 1, with:
 ()  (1  
e)
z
"
1 + 
1 + (1   e)=zp
[(+  e)  ]2   4(1   e)(1 + )
#
We can easily show that  0() > 0. Moreover, using (8), we have:
 () = +1
 (0) =
(1 + )(1   e)
(+  e)
Therefore, if  (0) < 1, there exists b 2 (0; ) such that  () < 1 for all  < b.
Using Proposition 3, we deduce the proposition.6
Under Proposition 3, the positive environmental and macroeconomic ef-
fects occur if the scal reform raises z (or k). Here, a larger environmental tax
rate implies a variation of the debt-output ratio, the income tax rate staying
constant. We show that when a larger  e implies a lower debt-output ratio ,
capital accumulation raises. Since the income tax rate is constant, the debt-
output ratio modies k or z through the level of the crowding-out e¤ect only.
This conguration is especially interesting because the scal policy allows to
improve aggregate consumption and environmental quality by reducing the
debt-output ratio. Regarding the debt sustainability constraints faced by
many countries today, this scal reform gives rise to a third dividend.
6Note that in order to ensure under-accumulation, the conditions obtained in this
proposition should be in accordance with Proposition 4. Case (i) of Proposition 4 is
satised for 1   (1   g)= < e 6 ^e: This requires  > (1   )=(1 + ), which is
satised for  su¢ ciently close to 1. Case (ii) of Proposition 4 is fullled under the same
condition on , but e larger and close to ^e:
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7 Conclusion
This paper examines the e¤ects of environmental tax reform in an overlap-
ping generations model by taking into account a debt stabilization constraint
and public pollution abatement. We show that, when the budget-neutral
reform allows a decrease in the income tax, the steady state investment fac-
tor increases. This result implies an increase in the pollution emission, the
(rst) environmental dividend cannot be obtained in the absence of pub-
lic abatement. On the other hand, the second (i.e. economic) dividend is
obtained when the economy is characterized by under-accumulation of the
per worker capital stock. Finally, an increase of the environmental taxation
budget-balanced by a variation of the debt-output ratio may also increase
the environmental quality and the aggregate consumption. Hence, the scal
policy allows to improve aggregate consumption and environmental quality
by reducing the debt-output ratio.
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